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This study investigates the development of the notion of man's will
upon which Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche based their theories.

Al-

though this topic had been virtually neglected in the great intellectual
debates of the first to the eighteenth centuries, by the nineteenth century the question of man 1s vii 11--i ts origin, function, and va 1ue--domi nated such philosophical discussions.

An exploration of the differences

in the perception and role of the will in the works of these three men
is attempted, from Kant's redefinition of the nature of v1ill, to Schopcr1hauer1s redirection of its position in philosophical matters, to Nietzsche's radical reinterpretation of the entire problem.

An examination

of these profoundly different interpretations and implications reveals
that Kant 1s effort to emancipate the wi 11 from its causal connections to
make room for moral responsibility \'Jas transformed by Nietzsche into an
attempt to liberate mankind from his own moral and metaphysical misunderstandings.
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Prologue

Curious as it may first appear, one of the v1tal intellectual
issues of the past two centuries, the concept of man's will' had been
virtually neglected in the great philosophical debates which had punctuated enlightened discourse from the first to the eighteenth centuries.

During the nineteenth century, however, as a result of Kant's

11 revolution 111

in philosophy, the question of man's will--its origin,

function, and value--became of paramount importance in philosophical
matters.

Not only Kant, but also Schopenhauer and Nietzsche made the

will basic to their own theories, albeit with profoundly different interpretations and implications.

This study will explore some of the

differences in the perception and role of the will in the works of
these three men.
Since Kant (1724-1804) is the chronological, as well as the theoretical, precursor to both Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Nietzsche (18441900), his views will be examined

fir~t.

But because Kant set the

terms of this discussion by redefining the nature of will and its place
in philosophical thought, it is necessary to survey some of the notions
of will which were prevalent before him.

There are problems inherent

in this undertaking, the most annoying of which is the elusiveness of a
definition of will itself.

This is obviously crucial to any discussion

of its "redefinition, 11 but proves to be exceedingly difficult to pin
down, partly because thinkers--even one as meticulous as Kant--have not
subscribed to any single definition of will.

An attempt, however, must

be made even at the risk of over-simplifying the issue.
Throughout western thought, the will was often used as a blanket
ii

-tenn to include appetites,

desires,·~r

bodily needs.

Althou~h

there

were numerous variations in such definitions over a period of many centuries, they did have one element in co111110n:

they did not refer to

man's will as a separate faculty, i.e., a separate capability or power
of one's mind, as reason, for example, often was.

But the definition

of will which is central to understanding the revolutionary focus of
Kant's enterprise at the end of the eighteenth century is precisely
that of will as an autonomous faculty, which he first employs in his
Critique of Pure Reason (1781), and which is later seized upon with
such profoundly perverse consequences by Schopenhauer qnd Nietzsche.
In this first critique, Kant describes our will as that which spontaneously initiates a new series in time.

This definition of will as a

source of action is further broadened in Kant's subsequent Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and in the Critique of Practical
Reason (1788) to include will as the basis of all our moral actions. 2
This is a direction which is novel and quite different from all prior
definitions of will; however, it is a path followed by neither Schopenha~er

nor Nietzsche.
That this notion of will as a separate faculty would have seemed

strange to earlier philosophers is evident from a brief review of the
definitions which predominated during the Classical, Hellenistic, and
Christian eras.

As Hannah Arendt notes in The Life of the Mind:

Wil-

ling, 11 the faculty of the Will was unknown to Greek antiquity . . . 113
What she means by this is that the concept of wi 11 as a component of
the mind, capable of initiating something altogether new in time, was
iii

.not one which was discussed by the greatest of these thinkers. 4 She
observes, in fact, that the tenn "free will , 11 which presupposes the
view that one might choose not to follow a particular course of action,
is notably lacking in the language of Classical Greece. 5 She finds,
too, that this "neglect" of will as a faculty capable of acting contingently, which is common to most of the pre-Socratic philosophers, is in
accordance with the temporal concepts of antiquity.

These stressed the

cyclical nature of life, in which nothing totally new ever occurred.
Even Aristotle, whose views differed in many ways from these,
still did not have a concept of the will.

Although he did develop the

related notion of 11 proairesis 11 ( 11 before makin9 a choicel!), whereby one
chooses between alternate objects or ways of conduct, Arendt contends
that this is merely "liberum arbitrium 11 ("free choice"), in which the
goals of such choices are already given.

Thus, while one may choose a

certain means to an end--one may refrain from drinking in excess--one
chooses this path because one knows that good health (the "given" goal)
demands this abstinence.

Since the ends are already determined, this

faculty of choice is neither spontaneous, autonomous, nor the beginning
of something entirely new, but is only the arbiter between reason and
desires, neither of which will ever lead to action of its own accord. 6
After the first century A.D., with the growth of Christian doctrine
of time to rival the cyclical and deterministic classical ones, a shift
occurred in the definition of will which was to become crucial to Kant's
enterprise.

This shift had to do both with a changed view of temporal-

ity, and a new focus on will as something which functions within the
iv

.mind as a whole in conjunction with reason/desire/intellect.
The Christians developed, first of all, a concept of rectilinear
time, which brought with it the idea of something new oriqinating in
time.

This new beginning was Christ, who had come once to sa1ve man

from his own sins.

When Christ comes the second time, it will not be

as part of an unending cycle of recurrent events, but as herald to the
end of the world.

Moreover, their idea of immortality, of future heav-

enly rewards or hellish punishments, as the Apostle Paul noted, was
meaningless in a world governed by the laws of casuality.

If all events

were determined by antecedent events in time, then one could be neither
commended nor. reprimanded for his acti ans, and the ethi ca 1 demands for
Christians to lead a morally good life were empty.

For only if the acts

so judged were 11 free 11 --i.e., under the control of the aqent who could
choose to do or not to do them--would moral judgments of approbation and
disapprobation become meaningful.
11

Paul resolved, therefore, that we are

free 11 to do right or wrong, but our salvation ·is not determined by our

will, but by God's mercy.
Paul's dilemma was this:

How could one resolve the conflicting

claims between God's power, which was omnipotent, and His judgment,
which was equitable?

If God is all-powerful, then He certainly has the

power to make us act any way He wants us to.

If that is the case, how-

ever, then God can not judge our actions at all, for to do so would be
to judge Himself.

God has, therefore, chosen to limit His own power to

give us the freedom to believe in Him or not, and to act accordingly.
Since there is no chain of events that automatically leads us to faith,
v

·we have "free will," at r.east to the extent of choosing to believe in
God or not.

Through the power of God's mercy; He judges us not on the

basis of our acts alone, but also on the strength of our faith in Him.
Yet even Paul's c0111T1itment to "free will" (about which more will
be said later) does not postulate an autonomous faculty.

Paul proclaimed

the will to be ultimately impotent because it automatically splits, producing its own counter-wi 11 (the

11

I wi 11 11 and the

11

I will -not 11 ) , which

binders the will from ever successfully making a difference either in
this world, or the next.

We can neither will nor strive for our own

salvation because such matters are governed solely by God's mercy, which
is in turn based upon God's will, not man's.
is out of our control:

Thus, our future salvation

it is precisely this element of control--of pow-

er to affect our own future--that truly distinguishes the Kantian concept of will from its predecessors.
The Stoic version of the will, which was flourishing contemporaneously with Pauline Christianity, was similarly impotent.

It also was

unable to actively alter one's present or future condition.

Although

Epictetus declared the will to be omnipotent, closer examination reveals
that this was a curiously powerless form of power.
first decision was to know

11

Indeed, the will 's

'the 1imi ts of the wi 11 to get and the wi 11

to avoid . . . and to dismiss those things that are beyond us .

, .. 7

This leaves only the realm of interior psychological adjustment to external conditions in our control.

In other words, it is one's internal,

emotional response to events which is the crucial factor here, for Epictetus firmly believed that it was not pain or death which made us miservi

,,.

'able, but the fear of pain or death; therefore, in order to lead a serene, tranquil life, we need only to fear fearfulness itself.

Once we

have learned to be 11 apathetic 11 --unaffected by either life or death--and
to will ourselves to acceptance of our particular situation with tranquility, we will have achieved a life undisturbed by stonns or obstacles.
Epictetus further advised those who wished to live well to
11
•

•

1

let your wi 11 be that events should happen as they do.

1 118

Not

only is this a singularly unaggressive fonn of power, but it rests on
the Stoic notion of 11 heimarmene, 11 the 11 doctrine of fate which holds that
everything happens in hannony with the nature of the universe and that
every particular thing, man or animal, plant or stone, has its task alloted to it by the whole and is justified by it. 119

It is against just

such notions of universal hannony and detenninism, as well as individual
impotence, that the Kantian conception of will stands in opposition.
If, according to Webster in 1975, the will means 11 to control by the power of the will . . . 1110 , then we have come a long way from the Stoics. 11
The focus has shifted from the will as something which needs to be control led (in the form of appetites, desires, or fears), to something
which actively does the controlling, and is no longer subject to divine
mercy or the hannony of nature.
Despite their numerous differences, all of these theories are at
least in agreement on one very substantial notion:
the will is real.

they all assume that

But in the seventeenth century, in the wake of the

decline of Christian theological domination, there were some philosovii

·phers who challenged even this fundamental assumption.

Hobbes and Spin-

oza, for example, suggested that the will was not real, but an illusion.
Central to this contention was their association of will with freedom,
which Paul had made long before, and which plagued philosophers as diverse in attitude as Augustine, Kant, and Schopenhauer.

As Spinoza ex-

plained, if one assumed that a stone could be sensible of its own motion, then any stone set in motion by an outside force "'would believe
itself to be completely free and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish. 11112 We are similarly deluded into
believing ourselves to be free "'simply because [we] are conscious of
[our] actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are
detenni ned. ' 1113 Thus, by the end of the seventeenth centur~, the wi 11
was often admitted to be a "subjectively felt faculty," perhaps inherent
in the very structure of our consciousness, but nevertheless, it was
not a "real" faculty.

So when Kant turned to his task at the close of

the eighteenth century, he had inherited notions of the will that confinned either its impotence or its illusory nature.

Aqainst these posi-

tions, Kant's postulation of the will as the foundation of his philosophical system stands in stark contrast.

viii

Kant

Central to Kant's theory of the will is its association with reason.
We must, therefore, look briefly at Kant's. conception of the role of
reason in our functioning.

Although there is only one reason, Kant

claims that it has two distinguishable functions. In the Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant focusses on the use of 11 theoretical 11 reason, which
deals with man's cognitive faculty.

"Pure reason" is the means by

which we investigate our capacity for knowing things a priori through
understanding.

The central issue of this critique is to ascertain how

"synthetic a priori" judgments are possible. Before Kant, only analytic
statements such as: 11 2 + 2 = 411 ; or, "this chair is a piece of furniture,11 were considered to give a oriori knowledge, because they alone
contained their predicate within the concept of their subject. But as
Kant discovered in his first 11 revolutionary 11 insight, even the laws of
mathematics, the supposedly pure "analytic a priori" universally--true
statements, were actually synthetic--that is, they went beyond their
subject matter, and yet they were still a priori because they did not
need any particular experience to amplify their concepts.
In his second critique, the Critique of Practical Reason (1788),
Kant's objective is to prove that theoretical (pure) reason can have
practical applications in the realm of moral decisions, i.e., it can
and does affect the ways we act.

This. is of paramount importance if

Kant is to succeed in his task of uniting the previously incompatible
realms of objective and subjective knowledge.

In this work Kant con-

tends that an ethical system can be developed wholly a priori and can
be applied to man, because reason, which provides only the universal
1

2

fonn, is not dependent upon the specific data of the particular situation.

Although this may sound impossible at first, it is always neces-

sary to keep in mind that Kant had shown in the first critique that,
cont~ary

to traditional theories, knowledge was not just passive con-

fonn1tY to an object.

Instead, he had explained the phenomenal charac-

teristifs of objects in tenns of the behavior of the knowing mind, whose
structure makes it imperative that we use such orderin9 principles as
space and time to aid our understanding.

He had thus developed the no-

tion of an active reason that was not condemned to purely passive contemplation, but one that actually helped to fonn the world which it
examined.

What this means is that we have "a priori"

knowled~e of~

those aspects of objects which we ourselves have imposed on them.
What of the "reality" of those objects per se?

In his Foundations

of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a distinction between two
realms of reality, the noumenal and the phenomenal.

One of these realms

is composed of "things in appearance" which are subject to the causal
laws of nature.

These are the facts (or objects) of everyday life,

which are known to us throught the world of sensory experience.

These

are externally determined by their causal relationships to each other,
and are referred to as "phenomena." The other realm, which we can never 11 know 11 (because all the objects of our knowledge pertain to the sensory realm), but can only assume "behind the appearances," is that of
the "noumena. 11

These are the "things in themselves," the essences which

are not detennined by external contingencies, but instead establish
their own laws.

They are, therefore, free.

It is in this context that -Kant develops his notion of the auton-

3

·omous or "free" wi 11. The will, according to Kant, is the capacity of a
rational being for acting in accordance with the conception of laws.

By

this definition, Kant can show that pure reason can be practical in regard to the will, and that the will, in re9ard to morality, can be free.
He attempts to validate our basic belief in our own freedom by disclosing that the phenomenal world, which is determined by the causal laws of
nature, is only one aspect of the "real world" we can perceive.

For

there is another aspect to this world--that of the noumenal reality-which lies beyond the realm of appearances, and in which laws themselves
are formulated.

Since we are not solely a part of the natural world

(determined by external laws), but participants who use our reason to
intuit realms beyond any possible experience, and thereby attempt to understand the universal forms of laws, we are also part of the noumenal
world (where such laws are made).

Kant suggests that since "Neither ob-

ligation nor law can be derived from experience, for experience establishes no necessity . . . 1114 , and since we, as thinkinq bein(ls can imaaine such object--less concepts as obligations and laws, they must be
part of the noumenal reality--i.e., they exist outside of time or space,
and are not constrained by the natural laws of causality.

Further evi-

dence for this dual character of reality is our possession of a priori
knowledge, which puts us outside of the temporal order when it comes to
knowing~

While this may seem implausible at first, Kant explains that "there
is not the least contradiction between a thing in appearance (as belonging to the world of sense) being subject to certain laws of which it is
independent as a thing or being in itself. 1115 But the only point of mediation between these 2 realms is that offered by the free will, a con-

4

.cept which is not, in itself empirically knowable.
this interaction in the fo 11 owing way:

11 As

Kant tries to define

wi 11 is a kind of causality

of living beings so far as they are rational, freedom would be that
property of this causality by which it can be effected independently of
foreign causes detennining it . . . 1115 Kant seems to be saying that
freedom is here defined as the power to be a 11 cause 11 without being an
"effect" of some previous cause, i.e., the power to initiate a new series of causal relationships, which necessarily implies a position outside of time, for otherwise it would become part of an infinite reqress
in these relationships.

A few pages further, however, Kant admits that,

"The subjective impossibility of explaining freedom of the will is the
same as the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest
which man can take in moral laws. 1117
Yet we do take such an interest, even if we cannot logically explain our reasons for it.

Kant shows that we all have such interests;

and furthennore, that we also have ordinary-moral conv-ictions of dutyand obligation, which comprise our "moral a priori . 11

In fact, our "ob-

ligatoriness constitutes the essence of morality; 1118 and even if we cannot understand how a being in the world of appearances, such as we, can
ever impinge upon, much less formulate a law for, something in the world
of essences, we can still entertain the possibility of such an occurrence.
In what at first appears to be a surprising move, Kant broadens
his concept of freedom of the will to include the ability to make laws,
as well as to initiate a new series of causal events, which, of course,
would not have occurred if the will had been different.

Kant now estab-

5

lishes this legislative function of the will, and then equates his
"free will" with a will under "moral law. 11 Although this sounds contradictory, it is so only when one defines freedom in the negative sense,
i.e., as "freedom from" something else.

But this type of freedom is on-

ly of "limited liability, 11 because it does not free man from the natural
world, with its web of causal relationships.
11

legal 11 sense.

It is merely freedom in a

Only the rational will, which operates in the noumenal

realm, can free us in the positive sense, since it alone is capable of
providing a basis "for determination independent of the world of sense.
It thus is seen as "freedom to 11 do something.

But what is this some-

thing?
Kant argues that the will and its actions, whatever they may be,
are actually free only when they have been "determined by the totality
of ends and requirements of their unity. 1119 That is, only the well-being of mankind as a whole can serve as the determinant of the rational
will.

It is not enough for us to will our own happiness as the 9uide to

our moral behavior.

For, although the desire for happiness may be uni-

versal, happiness itself is individual, and a world filled with individuals all striving for their own personal pleasures is a world of chaos
and conflict.

If we could, however, decide that:

"I will act so that

I can enjoy my life in my own way, 1120 all of our subsequent actions
would be themselves determined by our own individual concept of "enjoy"
at any particular moment.

We would never be "free", even though we each

had "freely chosen" to satisfy our own desires, because these desires
would themselves imprison us within our own particularity.
This is why Kant insists that the wi 11 and its actions are 11 unfree 11

6

.when they have been determined by some individual object of desire,
such as one's own particular happiness or well-being.

For us to be

freely willing moral agents, we must, therefore, act according to a rational principle, i.e., the moral law, and not from any inclination to
an object in the sensuous realm.

Kant repeatedly insists that for an

action to be "morally good 11 , it is not sufficient for it to conform to a
moral law; rather, it must be done for the sake of that law. 21 The reason for this is that anytime there is a specific content given to a law,
it is necessarily limited in its application and its validity.

So, if

we merely "conform" to a moral law, we are not, by Kant's definition,
following the formal, universal law legislated by reason, for Kant's law
is based upon no particular content; therefore, it would be impossible
to "conform" to it.

As Kant explains,

"Th~

sole principle of morality

consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e., a desired
object) and in the accompanying of choice by the mere universal legislating fonn which a maxim must be capable of·-hav-ing. That independence,
however, is freedom in the negative sense, while this intrinsic legislation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive
sense.

Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else than the autono-

my of the pure practical reason, i.e., freedom. 1122
It appears as though Kant has introduced yet another dualism here;
now freedom itself has 2 different aspects, as do reason and reality.
There is "negative freedom," which looses us from the laws of nature
(from necessity), and there is also "positive freedom," whereby someone
willing gives himself a law, and then sul:xnits to its jurisdiction, rather than sul:xnitting to an alien one.

This positive freedom is actually

7

the source of the law that the free will follows when initiating a new
. of even t s in
. t.ime. 23 since
. l. t 1s
. th is
. mora 1 ac t of se 1f - 1eq1s
. 1aseries
tion (submitting to one's own law) which liberates us from the determination of causal relationships, freedom is now seen clearly as residing in the individual subject--not in the objective world of sensory
experiences.
But this connection between law and free will also serves as a
bridge between the two aspects of the world.

For the laws of causality do

operate in our everyday phenomenal realm; therefore, it follows that our
free will itself can not be lawless, but must operate accordinq to laws
of a 11 peculiar kind, 1124 one of which is self-legislation.

Kant believes

that nothing less than the dignity of humanity itself, its intrinsic
worth, is based upon this capacity to formulate universal normative laws
to which it is also subject.
Moral value, and our primary responsibility, are thus found to lie
within 11 the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends which can be
realized by such action.

For the will stands, as it were, at the cross-

roads half-way between its a priori principle which is formal and its a
. . lncent1ve
.
.
. mater1a
. l . 1125 The moral will, therefore,
poster1or1
wh"ic h 1s

signifies a relationship between our a priori reason and our a posteri_.£!:_i (known through experience) desires.
aspects of all acts of will:

For these are two distinguishable

a want for something in the sensuous

world, which is a dynamic incentive to our impulses; and a recoqnition
of duty, which is a cognitive realization of what we l!ought 11 to do.

It

is this distinction that separates acts of will from those of mere desire, in which the:bbjects are the

sole·goals:of-~ur

behavior. _But

8

.Kant maintains that acts of will are further guided by knowledge of the
principle which relates such actions objectively.

The fundamental dif-

ference that this makes is seen in the fact that althou~h all animals
have desire, only rational men possess will. 26 It is solely throuah our
reason that we become aware of ourselves, and consequently aware of the
conflicting claims between our duty and our desires.

As noted earlier,

Kant claims that nature itself presents us with neither a sense of obligation or of duty, and it is only by using our powers of self-reflection
that we are able to separate ourselves from the realm of nature, and
participate in the noumenal realm by consciously and freely willing to
do either "good" or "evil."
Man's only guides to such actions are found in Kant's notion of
"imperatives," which are commands of reason that function as constraints
upon a will which is not totally aood, i.e., upon a human will. 27 There
are two :krnds at imperatives, hypottt~ticai and cate~fo-rica1.

·l-1yperttiet·ica1

imperatives are those in which the action is good only as a means to
something else; but a categorical imperative is one in which the action
is good in and of itself--as an end, not as a means.
only one categorical imperative.

It is:

There is, however,

"Act only accordinq to that

maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law. 1128 For it is through the necessity of an action performed from respect for this law that duty, which is the "condition" of
a will which is good in itself, arises.

Only those actions which are

performed according to duty, not desire, have moral worth.

Furthennore,

this worth is determined by the universal form of the moral law, not by
its particular content.

9

Yet it is just this emphasis on the fonn of the categorical imperative, rather than its content or context, which has led to numerous
criticisms from other philosophers who either failed to grasp, or to
agree with, Kant's attempt to find a via media between the chaotic anarchy of a free will subject to no laws, and the oppressive tyranny of
one subject to laws imposed from without.

Kant claims that the "free

will must find its ground of determination in law, but independently of
the material of the law. 1129 His categorical imperative achieves this
precisely because it does not attain its validity through any "utilitarian accomplishment of predetermined ends", (in which case it would be
merely a means
11

11

);

but rather, through the form of its universal legis-

lation, it proves itself to be an end.

Since this moral imperative is a

law formulated by reason, and not by experience gained

throu~h

the sens-

es, it is forma1 11 ; therefore, it is not determined by any of the causa 1
11

laws of nature pertaining to the phenomenal realm.

In other words, it

is based on autonomy--or free will--and thus is not limited in its validity or applicability to any particular content or context. 3 Further-

°

more, this form is not, as some detractors have suggested, empty of content, but by its very universalizability it prescribes a criterion by
11

11

which any law can be evaluated.
Although this may sound as if it is contradictory, or at best confusing, it is consistent with Kant's other attempts to rP.solve such
seemingly contradictory concepts as

t~i ngs-:;.~n~Pappearaoce,

i n--themse l ves, or free will and detenninism.

and' ,thtn~s-

To Kant, such contradic-

tions are apparent rather than real, and are the result of our application of the rules of one realm to the objects in another.

As Kant had

10

warned, 11 Freedom . . . among all the ideas of speculative reason is the
only one whose possibility we know a priori.

We do not understand it,
but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know. 1131

But if freedom can never be understood completely, because it is the object of something in the noumenal realm (i.e., moral will), not of something in the phenomenal realm (which human understanding determines), it
can sti 11 be thought of as a possi bi 1ity; and the fact that vie fa i 1 to
understand it does not in any way negate or limit its reality.
vJith his observation that 11 obedience to the law that one has himself prescribed is the only real freedom 1132 , because it is the only time
that our actions are not determined by causal events in the phenomenal
world, Kant feels he has discovered an essential connection between the
apparently contradictory concepts of laws and freedom.

He thus can offer

a way to transcend the paradox of our position as self-conscious

bein~s

who are phenomenally determined in the world of appearances, but noumenally free in the world of essences, and this is but another of his 11 revolutionary11 theories.

In the final analysis, it would appear as if

Kant had successfully accomplished his primary objectives.

With his

fundamental identification of practical reason with will, Kant was able
to re's cue our concept of free

1-1Ji 11

from the causal determinism sugaested

by 18th century scientific and philosophic thought, and thereby to offer
a way out of the apparent dualisms within his own system. In this way,
Kant made good on his 11 revolutionary1 1 attempt to liberate thought,
through a self-critique of the limits of reason, from the traditional
stalemate between the dogmatic claims of the rationalists and the skeptical attacks of the empiricists.

11
It s hou 1d be apparent by now that Kant 1 s concept of a free \.'!ill is

incredibly more complex than just a source of action.
11

11

It is also the

source for all moral decisions and actions, the bridge between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, and the legislatina agent which is both author of, and obedient to, its own laws.

It is undeniably real, and the

locus of power is firmly established in the individual--but this power
is expressed only through the ethical demands of reason in the forfTl of
the categorical imperative.
The question arises, how such a previously neglected notion as the
autonomous faculty of will could have developed into the foundation for
a sophisticated philosophical system such as Kant's?

How was it pos-

sible for the concept of will to rid itself of its illusory or subordinated position, which it had acquired by the end of the seventeenth
century, and to become the focal point of philosophy--all within a span
of approximately one hundred years? 33 It seems reasonable to suaqest that
two developments within this period were crucial.

First,

11

man

11

became

the object of both scientific and philosophic investigations, a process
encouraged by the factual advancement of scientific revolution and the
theoretical insights of such early Enlightenment thinkers as Descartes,
Locke, and Vico.

By 1785, when Kant's Foundations of the t1etaphysics of

Morals was published, the successful conclusion of the American Revolution proved that men and women could alter not only their own present,
but their future as well.34 In such an intellectual climate, Kant's postulation of the will as the basis of both freedom and morality was not as
unthinkable as it might have been even a few decades before.
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Schopenhauer
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Kant's

11

revolutionary 11 focus on the \.'Jill as a basic component of his

philosophical system stimulated further investigations and interpretations of the will throughout the lgthcentury, several of which finally departed in important respects from Kant's metaphysical conceptton of the
\-Jill and his belief in its central moral function. 'One of the earliest of
these is Schopenhauer's multivolume \tJOrk, The \•Jorld as Hill and Idea
(1818).

As this title suggests, Schopenhauer also places the will at

the center of his philosophical theories.
ference:

But it is with a decided dif-

for Schopenhauer not only distinguishes the will from anv rea-

son whatsoever, whether it be

11

pure 11 or

11

practical

11

the essentially amoral nature of the will itself.

,

but also asserts

Kant's view thus an-

pears to have spawned its own antithesis in Schopenhauer.
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's views are based upon the Kantian philosophy.

He repeatedly refers to himself as

11

Kant s true successor".
1

Schopenhauer explains how he could owe so much to Kant, and yet deviate
so far from his views on the most crucial matters, in a lenathy critique
in The World as Will and Idea.

Here he credits Kant with perceivinn

the fundamental distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms,
but then chides him for not attaining

11

to the knowledge that phenomena

is the \tJOrld as idea, and the thing in itself is the will. 1135 Schopenhauer thus accepts Kant's dualistic vision of reality, and believes that
he has actually perfected the Kantian system by discovering the true nature of the noumenal realm.

Although Kant had claimed that this knowl-

edge was forever barred from man's understanding, Schopenhauer disaarees.
As Schopenhauer explains, Kant had seen that all natural laws, as
well as the world itself, were conditioned by

~1e

fonn of the subject's
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·knowledge. That is, our knowledge of our world is always determined by
the a priori forms (such as, space and time) which we have imposed on
our experience, or in Schopenhauer's paraphrase of this Kantian insiqht,
"the world is my idea 1136 ; however. thiS vi.ston of the world as 1tdea_ is
merely its phenomenal appearance, not its noumenal essence.

To discover

this noumenal reality, Kant had used his reflective knowledge to posit
the "other side of appearances".

But this assumption of the noumenal

was itself based upon an inference from the law of causality, which held
that our.sensations must have an external cause.

Since the notions of

causality, space, and time--the forms of the visible world which condition our very perception of it by our senses--are known-'-to: ·us. a ptior.i
through intuition, it follows that such purely intuitive perceptions
underlie our empirical perceptions.
Yet this is precisely the point at which Kant became "confused".
For if these concepts are all known to us a priori, Schopenhauer claims,
they are, consequently, functions of our intellect; therefore, they are
of subjective origin, and sensation itself is purely subjective.

Kant's

"mistake" is that he failed to distinguish properly between perceptible
knowledge (what we know by intuition or sensation) and abstract knowledge (what we know by r.eason or reflection). 37 This failure led to
Kant's "inextricable confusion" of intuitive and abstract knowledqe, in
which Kant further confused the idea of perception with that of abstract
ideas and called it "experience. 1138 Schopenhauer cites several examples ·
of this confusion in Kant's works:

for example, in his Prolegomena to

any Future Metaphysics (sections 20-22), Kant claimed that perception
and sensation belong only to our sensory experience, while judoment
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(thinking) belonged solely to our understandin9.

But if we apply the

law of causality entirely a priori (prior to our experience of chanqes
experienced by our senses), this "law" is of as subjective an orioin as
our sensations are; therefore, it can not lead to any noumenal knowledge.39
Schopenhauer rescues Kant's "true and imoortant insight" as to the
a priori nature of the causal 1aw from Kant s "fa 11 aci ous proofs" by
1

claiming that "empirical perception is and remains merely our idea; it
is the world as idea.'AO

From this realization, Schopenhauer argues

that there is no real difference between experience and its object;
therefore, the reality j2_ the representation, and more specifically, the
world is my representation.

Only through our o\'m self-conscious aware-

ness, which "proclaims the will as the inner nature of our own rhenomena11, 41 can we realize that the will is also the
world itself.

11

inner essence" of the

Schopenhauer contends that such intuitive insiohts into

our own nature provide parallel insights into the nature of reality pe_!:_
se and allow us to perceive that the core of mankind and the core of
the world is will . 42
But what is this generalized concept of the will, which is the metaphysical basis of all phenomena?

Here again, Schopenhauer distances

himself from Kant by defining the will as the ultimate principle of
being--as "one almighty, indestructible, eternal 1143 strivino for ''something''.

The will is the causeless craving which only expresses the will

to live--to continue existing--but which has no specific qoal.

It is

unrest, demand, an insatiable desire for existence that wells up as soon
as it has been satisfied:

it is the true expression of the world's (and

15

our) innermost being.

Yet because this will is the noumenal reality, it

exists outside of space and time, and only becomes the 11 world 11 as it becomes objectified.:!_!! space and time accordinq to the principle of individuation.

In other \'/Ords, as it becomes divided aaainst itself,

against its essential one-ness, and becomes objectified as
11

11

! 11 and

they, 11 (as the world and its multiplicity of beinas), it beqins to

strive against itself.

This is a direct result of the fact that each

particular individual now strives for himself.
This will is not only egoistic, but--a radical departure from Kant-is opposed to the welfare of anyone other than ourselves, and is, therefore, heedless of moral considerations altooether. 44

Furthermore, we

ourselves, as manifestations of this will, are imbued with an overpowering a priori desire for life:

We ourselves are the \vill to live, and
therefore we must live, well or ill .'r4 5 Hence, our primary focus and
11

only direction, which is given to us a priori and grounded in noumenal
reality, is to exist, to continue beinq, and moral laws or cateoorical
imperatives have no foundation in such a primeval force as Schopenhauer's
wi 11 .
Even the world itself, as it manifests this all-encompassing,
blindly demanding will, seems far removed from the Kantian realm, VJhere
order, reason, and morality prevail.

Instead, Schopenhauer's \'torld is

one in which chaos reigns over meaningless struqale and strife, and our
only source of satisfaction and stabi l i ty--our self-conscious a1<Jareness
of ourselves as individual beings--is itself an illusion.

For as,

Schopenhauer notes, "at bottom, it is the \'Jill that is spoken of \·!hen··
ever

1

1 1 appears in a judgment. 1146

Since there is no ultimate distinc-

tion between 11 my 11 \'fill and 11 your 11 will, (both are merely manifestations
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of the primordial will), the world is nothing more than the site of distressing conflict and deception, and the

11

I" of my a\A.Jareness is no more

than the "mouthpiece" of the will to live, which "gnaws at itself forever. 1A7
As dismally depressing as this seems, the fact that I do have selfconsci ous awareness provides my only pathv1ay of escape from the misery
and insatiable wants of this world.

Although the vJill, "as noumena,

constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; in itself, however, it is unconscious.

For consciousness is conditioned by

the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accident of our beinq . . . 1A
It is only the knovJing intellect, which is itself
vant of the will, 1A

9

11

passive" and a 11 ser-

v1hich can become aware of the nature of the vmrld

as will, and can penetrate the illusions of individuation to perceive
the noumena 1 rea 1i ty of the vii ll .

Or, as Schopenhauer puts it,

11

The

will is the substance of man, the intellect the accident; the will is
the matter, the intellect is the form; the \'Jill is the warmth, the intellect is the light. 1150

In direct opposition to the traditional theo-

ries, Schopenhauer cites further evidence of the will 1 s power over the
intellect:

"The intellect is really like the reflective surface of the

water, but the water itself is like the will, whose disturbance, therefore, at once destroys the clearness of that mirror and the distinctness
of its images.

1151

And, while the intellect may become tired, because

knowing is always accompanied by effort, the will is never tired, because willing is our very nature, and thus requires neither effort nor
practice.

52

The will 1 s dominance requires that, at times, the 11 intel-

lect must do violence to its own nature, which aims at the truth, for it
compels its

self , contrary to its ovm laws, to regard as true thin9s

8
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which are neither true nor probable, . . . in order to appease . . . for
a while the restlessness and unmanageability of the will. 1153
After thus "proving" the ultimate impotence of the intellect in relation to the will, Schopenhauer surprisinqly asserts that this very
same intellect may function "free" from the wil 1.

It does this through

self-awareness, by which "knowledge breaks free from the service of the
will, by subjectively ceasing to be merely individual, and thus becoming the pure \\Ii 11-1 ess subject of knowledge . . . 1154

Once the intellect

has, through contemplation, perceived the one-ness of the will behind
the veil of multiplicity, it can quiet and st1fle the will--temporarily.
In fact, this "whole knm\lledge of the nature of the world, the mirror of
the will, which has grown up through the comprehension of Ideas, becomes
a quieter of the will; and thus free, the will suppresses itself. 1155
This contemplation is facilitated by both aesthetic and philosophic
speculations, but is itself always subject to the tension between the
temporary supremacy of our intellect, and the eternal supremacy of the
Wl· 11 • 56

Although it is not altogether clear how the intellect can ever aain
supremacy over the will, one can infer, from Schopenhauer's contention
that the 1tlill, when "freed" by intellectual contemplation, "suppresses
itself", that his theory allows for some form of freedom for the will.
But this he specifically does not do when speakinq of the will in the
phenomenal realm--which is the only realm in which we can sensibly speak
of having "free \'Jill 11 •57 schopenhauer agrees with Kant that while freedom
is commonly defined in a negative way, as the absence of restraints,
when freedom manifests power, it becomes positive.

Schopenhauer differ-
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entiates among three different types of freedom--physical, intellectual,
and moral.

Physical freedom is expressed by the notion that everythin!l

moves or acts only as a result of its own will; intellectual freedom
presupposes that we have voluntary control over our own thoughts; and
the concept of moral freedom assumes that
I will . 11

11

I am free when I can do what

Although these distinctions are not quite clear, Schopenhauer

focusses on the last assumption.

He discovers that the notion of moral

freedom raises the question whether I am free to will my ovm volitions.
This is the crucial issue to Schopenhauer, who sees the real question
here to be:

"does the will retain the freedom to will or not to will? 1158

Essential to this question is the distinction between wishino and
v1illing.

Schopenhauer explains that one 11 can wish two opposin0 actions,

but will only one of them.

Only the act reveals to his self-consciousness which of the two he wills. 1159 What is truly at issue here is the
grounds of each act of willing.

If, as Schopenhauer contends, man's

v1ill .:12_ his authentic self, the true "core of his being", then it constitutes the ground of his being, and is something beyond v1hi ch he cannot go.

In other words, man "is as he wills, and wills as he is .

Therefore, to ask him whether he could also will differently than he
does is to ask whether he could also be other than himself; and that he
does not know. 1160 Although Schopenhauer agrees with the subjectivelyfelt fact that we all self-consciously believe that we can do what we
will, he further explains:

"'You can do what you will, but in any oiven

moment of your life you can will only one definite thing, and absolutely
nothing other than that one thing. 11161 We thus have only a 11 relative
and comparative freedom" which is dependent upon our capability of
thought.

This gives us a greater number of choices than animals
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.have, because we are free of the immediate compulsion of perception that
forces them to act, but is not what we usually mean by "freedom", i.e.,
acting without restraints.

We are, however, always subject to our "nat-

ural delusion" that posits our firmly held, self-conscious conviction
that we have freedom over our own will.

In a passaqe that is reminis-

cent of Spinoza's parable of the stone's certainty of its own freedom of
motion, Schopenhauer describes the water's similar conviction:
'I can make high waves (yes! in the sea durinq a storm); I
can rush down hill (yes! in the river bed); I can plunge down
foaming and gushing (yes! in the waterfall); I can rise freely as a stream of water into the air {yes! in the fountain),
. . . but I am doing none of these things now, and am voluntarily6~emaining quiet and clear water in the reflectin9
pond.'
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's belief in the illusory asoect of the
11

fr'eedom .of ::-.our\ wi 11 :is ,·fundamentally'. opposed .to:· Spinoza ~'s :view. -·For
11

Schopenhauer never doubts the reality of the will itself, which is Spinoza's contention, but only the illusion as to its freedom in the phenomenal realm.

Schopenhauer attempts to explain away this confusinq as-

pect of the will by positing the origin of our belief in our own free
will as the result of our perception of the noumenal reality of the will
itself.

The will "reveals itself to every one directly as the in-itself

of his own phenomenal being. And it is also this immediate knowledge of
one's own will out of which in human consciousness the concept of
freedom springs; for certainly the will as world-creating, as noumena,
is free from the principle of sufficient reason and therewith from all
necessity, thus is completely independent, free, and indeed almiqhty 63
11

•

Although our own will, as it participates in this phenomenal world,
is subject to the causal laws of nature, (from which Kant had liberated
it), it is "free" only so far as it manifests the noumenal will--the
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driving force of our being--behind it.

But we have no power or control

over this will in the long run, only the temporary respite from its eternal striving which is offered by intellectual contemplation of artistic works or philosophical principles.

As Schopenhauer further explains,

our notion that 11 1 can will this" carries along \<1ith it an additional
clause, "if I did not prefer the other."

"But this addition annuls that

ability to wi 11. 1164
Perhaps Schopenhauer 1 s greatest distance from Kant is obvious here.
Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer sees man as an objectification of the primordial will--vJhich means that man is an object, not a subject; therefore,
like all other objects of experience, man is a phenomenon in space and
time, and thereby subject to the causal laws of nature.

"If freedom of

the will \<Jere presupposed, every human action would be an inexplicable
miracle--an effect without a cause. 1165 This is impossible, of course,
,_

in the phenomenal realm v1hich operates under the laws of causality,
where Schopenhauer defines "cause" itself as the "antecedent change
which makes the follm'Ving one necessary. 1166
From the preceding, it would seem as though Schopenhauer had abandoned any pretense of a philosophy which could deal with moral matters.
By denying both the transcendent God of traditional thought, as well as
the Kantian free will, Schopenhauer at first appears to eliminate all
possibility of ethical choice from his interpretation of the world.

He

claims that "no system of ethics is possible which moulds and improves
the will itself.

For all teaching onlj affects knowledqe, and knowledpe

never determines the will itself

1167

But this is not the whole

picture, since Schopenhauer does believe in ethical responsibility for
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.the content of one's actions.

"From what we do we know what we are. 1168

It is from this assertion that we achieve consciousness of the responsibility and moral demands of life.

"In a word, man does at all times on-

ly what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily. But this is due to
the fact that he already~ what he wills. 69 Even though we all sub1
:

jectively believe that we do only what ·we will, this merely means that
our actions are the pure expressions of our very own being.

For Schop-

enhauer firmly contends, as noted before, that it is the will that is
spoken of whenever 11 111 appears in a judgment. 70
Although this view may seem to have the cards unfairly stacked against the individual who wishes to do "good", this is precisely Schopenhauer's point.

Because he claims that, "everyone knows his will only

in its successive acts, and not as a whole, in and for itself; thereforP..
no one knows his character a priori, but only learns it through experience and always i;ncompletely. 1171 By denying us the complete picture of
what/who we are at any given moment, we may be led to reflect upon our
own individuation and perceive its illusory nature.

If so, we may come

to the realization that our ego is identical with that of others, and
that the barriers separating us from others are unreal. Through such
contemplation, we.would learn that the principle of individuation is
valid only in the phenomenal world of appearances, and that the true nature of each of us is identical.

We would then have compassion (some-

times translated as "pity") for others, for we would see and feel the
suffering of others as if it were our own--which it is. It is this compassion which is the basis of Schopenhauer's morality. 72
Schopenhauer's distance from Kant is thus irrmense.

Not only is his

universe one in which chaos and the meaningless struggle to survive
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'Constitute noumenal reality,·but his foundation for morality, in which
one's ever-changing emotions detennine one's compassion--or the lack
thereof, is irrational; hence, it is the polar opposite of Kant's "pure
practical reason".

Yet there remains a line of continuity with Kant's

views, and even with those of Plato, in Schopenhauer's philosophy.

He

sees himself as their successor because they insisted , as he does, upon a disparity between what we perceive, (phenomena) and what is "really
real" (noumena).

Furthermore, the content of even our faulty percep-

tions is dependent upon our own intellectual apparatus (Plato's parable
of The Cave).

Thus, Kant's all-important insight that both objects in

space and time, as well as space and time per se, are conditioned by the
perceiving subject--and constitue our spectacles --is of primary significance for Schopenhauer, too. If, as some thinkers su9gest, 73 the
11

11

motive power behind all philosophy is the need to find something eternal
behind all change; and if, as Classical philosophers claimed, the more
lasting and real something was, the greater its perfection, then

Scho~

enhauer achieved his own "transvaluation of values" by positing the ever-striving will as the core of the noumenal reality.

For the "essence"

of all appearances is now seen to be an ever-changing, insatiable appetite for existence, which "wells up" as soon as it is satisfied, and
constantly seeks new paths of exploitation.

In other words, all that is

truly "eternal" is eternal change and process--but with no meaning,
"pattern", or "Plan" behind it.

In place of the "heavenly reward" for

morally "good" behavior on earth offered by Christian theolo9ians, or
the "eternal advancement of mankind" offered by Kant, Schopenhauer posits only the ephemeral feeling of compassion--and the realization that
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·both the suffering, and its amelioration, in others is our own.

Thus,

in Schopenhauer's moral system, to alleviate suffering in another is
suddenly a:crucial element in alleviating it in ourselves--and this
seems to be a perfect instance of "enlightened self-interest".
As one recent admirer of Schopenhauer explains:

"To stand up for

the temporal against merciless eternity is morality in Schopeobauer's
sense 11 •74 By postulating blind will as the eternal force--the only
reality, Schopenhauer unmasks the treachery of the old metaphysiCs by
11

showing that ~need is ever compensated for in any Beyond. 1175 For
Schopenhauer believes that all distinctions of morality are nothing more
than the creations of

and simply reflect our own feelings and desires within a particular context, at a particular time. 76 In Schopen~en,

hauer's view, one does not want something because it is "good", but defines it as "good" because he wants it, a point on which Nietzsche concurs.

In such a vision, a categorical imperative becomes an impossibil-

ity, and Kant's attempt to provide a universal fonn for morality becomes
an absurdity.

For if what is "good" is whatever an individual desires

at any moment, it can have no universal applicability.

The whole idea

of a categorical imperative is, in fact, a logical impossibility to
Schopenhauer, since all imperatives are due to some condition in the
phenomenal realm; therefore, an "unconditioned imperative" is a contradiction in tenns, 77 and any attempt to impose a moral law on basically
irrational beings is of little use.
Thus, while Kant's ethical system is one of imperative reason, with
an abstract a priori basis, Schopenhauer's is one of compassionate feeling, based on actual experience. 78 Where Kant scorns an empirical basis
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·for ethics in either feelings or inclinations, and instead locates it in
the noumena l character of rat tonal; bei:ngs :.whb· are:...:autcmom0us ::membeEs :of=
the moral order, Schopenhauer shifts the focus and maintains that morality, to have any real significance, must be rooted in real human experiences.

Although this appears to be a reasonable request, the practical

consequences of Schopenhauer's system show only the insignificance of
the human condition altogether.

His ethical theory, which is based on

sympathy, compassion, or 11 pity 11 with the condition of others who are
trapped, as we are, in a world of illusion--whose only "purpose" is to
manifest the purposeless force of the noumenal will--leads to, at best,
self-effacement at the prospect of such a pessimistic world view. 79 At
worst, it seems to lead to a desire for self-obliteration and the eventual extinction of all life.

For Schopenhauer appears to be saying that

the annihilation of individuality is desirable, if only temporarily possible; and since this individuality is only an objectification of the
metaphysical will, the annihilation of this noumenal will is also desirable--although permanently impossible.

While this derogation of reason

as a mere tool which the will employs to achieve its own temporary satisfaction and security may have helped topple reason from its unequalled
elevation at the hands of Enlightenment thinkers, it did so at the.expense of providing any 11 reason 11 why this nothingness--this annihilation
of the will and its manifestations--was preferable to anything else, no
matter how illusory.
In any case, one must wonder how such a pessimistic philosophy
could develop from its purportedly KanUan roots i.n 1ittle· mc~e bhan:.a
decade after Kant's death.

How did Plato's ideas 11 become, in Schopenhauer's system, "incurably gluttonous 11 , 80 and serve only as nourishment
11
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·for .the will? Some twentieth century thinkers have sunnised that Schopenhauer's theories grew out his "hatred for the indecent optimism of the
contemporary demagogy of progress, 1181 while others have seen his own
"passionate temperament" and bitter personal experiences as "conspiring to suggest to Schopenhauer the primacy and ultimacy of the will. 1182
Ce~tainly

Kant's philosophical "revolution", as well as the course of

the French Revolution, illuminated the limits of reason in ways previously unknown, while Rousseau's emphasis on the power of our emotions,
and Napoleon's rise to political power and predominance within Europe
illustrated the dynamic, forceful nature of change.

But, unfortunately,

within the first decade and a half of the new century, Napoleon's defeat
at Waterloo and the reactionary character of the Congress of Vienna in
1815 seemed to exemplify Voltaire's dictum:
the more they remain the same."

"The more things change,

It may be that these political events

paved the way for Schopenhauer's pessimistic vision, or at least enabled
him to perceive the illusory nature of much of the phenomenal realm.
This, coupled with his "imperfect understanding" of Indian philosophy, 83
perhaps facilitated Schopenhauer's postulation of will as the only reality.

Whatever factors, or combinations thereof, were responsible for

the fonnation of his thought, Schopenhauer left a philosophical legacy
which was itself later transformed by the works of Nietzsche into a vi-

.

sion of exhilarating possibilities.

Nietzsche
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Nietzsche's philosophical views, as they were articulated in the
latter half of the 19th century, are both a continuation and a rejection
of those of Kant and Schopenhauer.

It is their works which provide Niet-

zsche vii th certain insights and vocabulary, as v1ell as with enemies to
overcome.

Yet this fundamental similarity of interest is easily obscured

by Nietzsche's radically different style, methodology, and conclusions,
and by his later repudiation of much of Schopenhauer's teaching.

For

Nietzsche uses the thought of Kant and Schopenhauer as a springboard to
take off on a purportedly new direction for thought, thereby givinq the
will a new appearance as well.

It is, therefore, necessary to begin

with a brief overview of Nietzsche's project as a whole.
Central to rJietzsche's

course in philosophical inquiry is his

ne\•J

claim that it is our language which is responsible for many of the muddled metaphysical systems which are oerennially soringing up in the
quest for "truth" and

11

reality'

Nietzsche sees the problem as t\•'o-fold.

1
•

First, he contends that our minds are dominated by the grammatical
structure of our language.

We impose the subject/predicate relationship,

whereby every predicate requires a subject, onto the structure of the
world at

lar~e;

therefore, we demand that every action requires an agent.

The consequences of this projection of our own inability to comprehend
the world in any other terms are profound.

It is this subject/oredicate

relationship which is actually the basis for the distinction between the
noumenal and phenomenal realms.

Nevertheless, this distinction is one
,

that rests on erroneous reasoning, and is therefore, rejected by Nietzsche.

Instead, he suggests that:

"Once we understand that the subject

is an invention, the opposition between Ding, an Sich !.~ubject-in-itself~
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and appearance becomes untenable--so that the concept of appearance
collapses. 1184 Perhaps Nietzsche's refusal to accept the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena is responsible for his denial of all
such dualistic interpretations of the world as equally false and irrelevant.

As he explains, "there is no 'being' behind the doing, acting,

and becoming; the 'doer' has simply been added to the deed by the imaqination--the doing is everything. 1185
The second stumbling block is our necessity of thinking in words,
which we use as thouqh they were actually explanations of thinQs, and
from which we are thereby able to derive "knowledae 11 •
denies that this is, in fact, the case.

But Nietzsche

He believes that the·roots of

this problem lie in the prehistoric past, and originated because the
"sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only
giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was
expressing supreme knowledge of things. 1186 Nietzsche rejects this assumption, and claims: "'Thingness' was first created by us 11 •87 This
means that the fundamental relationship of all "things" is that of "being-an-object-for-an-interpreting-subject, 1188 and our interpretations
are of paramount importance in determining what we "know."
Moreover, Nietzsche contends that knowledqe "is not to 'know' but
to schematize--to impose upon chaos as much regularity and fonn as suffices for our practical requirements. 1189 The very fact that we do conceptualize and impose our own language-9ased schema on our world, which
is otherwise senseless and fonnless, is not only necessary; it is also
an example of our will to power--our human need to order and structure
our universe, and thus preserve our sense of dignity and importance.
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And we are not distinct from what we interpret or do.

We are will to

power, for our interpretation of this world is a mode of imposition, a
means by which we exert our power over our world, and attempt to
master over it.

beco~e

The world is, therefore, something that we make and

re-make, and has no meaning or structure other than what we give it.
Hence, Nietzsche's assertion:

"Against positivism, which halts at phen-

omena--'There are only facts'--! would say:

No, facts are precisely what

there are not, only interpretations. 1190 Obviously, Nietzsche's emphasis
on interpretation as one mode of the will to power

sug~ests

a very dif-

ferent view of will from those of Kant and Schopenhauer.
Furthennore, among these interpretations, or perspectives, which we
have created, are the "laws" of science and mathematics, including the
canons of logical argument and deduction.

Nietzsche maintains that log-

ic itself is nothing more than a scheme to make our world comprehendable
to us, and really "rests on presuppositions with which nothing in the
actual world corresponds. 1191 But logic and science, althouqh-fictitious
and erroneous, nevertheless are necessary for the preservation and enhancement
of mankind. 92 And language,
for all its limitations, is sim.
.
ilarly essential, for without it:

"we cease to think when we refuse to

do so under the constraint of language

Rational thought is inter-

pretation according to a scheme we can not jettison. 1193
Nietzsche, therefore, resigns himself to the use of a faulty tool,
language--because that is the only instrument available--to communicate
his philosophical insights.

At the same time, since he perceives that

language necessarily simplifies and thus distorts what it interprets,
Nietzsche attempts to limit its potential for falsification 94 by utiliz-
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.i ng:.·the·:st,Ylistic ·.devices,: of·:a·phori.sms-::atfd· 11 thou·ght :experirilents 11 ' .to·'dfs; .

close his views.

This is in direct opposition to the systematic studies

of the "essence" of reality undertaken by Kant and Schopenhauer, which
are "suspicious" to Nietzsche because they assume the veracity of linguistic and logical constructs.

He even goes so far as to suqgest that,

"The will to a system is a lack of integrity. 1195
Yet Nietzsche's approach is more than merely a reflection of this
anti-systematic bias.

Aphorisms and thought experiments are especially

well-suited to conveying various perspectives and interpretations, and
easily enable Nietzsche to adopt and discard notions freely.

Perhaps of

equal benefit, is their discontinuous nature, which Nietzsche finds
helpful in his attempts to disturb, and hopefully awaken, the thought
processes of his intellectually "lazy" audience. 96 This is, obviously,
a very different project from those of Kant and Schopenhauer, and thus
necessitates a different methodology.

Nietzsche explains this new di-

rection to philosophical inquiry, and the dangers inherent in such pursuits, in his preface to Daybreak (1887):

11

In this book you wi 11 dis-

cover a 'subterranean man' at work, one who tunnels and mines and undermines.1197 This is not only an apt description of Nietzsche's method of
seeking out the psychological and sociological origins of beliefs and
systems (as opposed to their "essences"); but also illustrates the corrosive impact of his views on those of traditional philosophic thought. 98
Before proceeding with an examination of Nietzsche's notion of the
will, however, it may be helpful to outline a few of the individual
debts--and later differences--which Nietzsche's thought owed to Kant and
Schopenhauer.

Initially, Kant's influence on Nietzsche appears to be
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more difficult to discern than. Schopenhauer's.

Yet Kant's attempt to

provide a "metaphysics of experience" was to have a pronounced effect on
Nietzsche's own work. 99 Central to this were Kant's ~ritique and limitation of reason, and his focus on the will.

Kant's disclosure that tra-

ditional metaphysical speculations {which aimed at establishing the
existence of God, immortal ityof the. soul, etc.) were unattainable because they were beyond all human experience and knowledge, however, contained a hidden element of "implicit agnosticism" which was not lost on

Ni~tzsche. lOO Additionally, Kant's Copernican R~volution in philosophy
held that the noumenal realm was forever outside of our possible knowledge, which was itself dependent on what we, as human beings, actually
are and do with our sensory imfonnation.
these Kantian notions:

Nietzsche accepts both of

that we make a subjective contribution to experi-

ence, and therefore to knowledge; and that we can never know the noumena1 (or "true") world.

Al though Ni etzsc.he adapts these concepts to ac-

c01T1Tiodate his own theories, nevertheless, it is these Kantian insights
which underlie his own insistence upon the interpretive and perspectival
nature of "truth", art, science, and mathematics.
But Nietzsche's overall reaction to the Kantian view that our knowledge is unable to transcend the limits of our own senses and experiences
is profoundly different from Kant's.

Instead of Kant's faint-hearted

attempt to limit reason and thereby make room for 11 faith 11 , Nietzsche decides to limit his own investigations to the phenomenal realm, the apparent world, which is the only one that we can ever "know".

Nietzsche

realizes that this choice requires the courage to acknowledge that there
is no eternal realm to which we may ever aspire.

Yet he sees his direc-

31

tion as preferable to Kant's deplorable contention that reason only
knows that it can never hope to comprehend the noumenal realm.

Nietzsche

finds Kant's claim to be both a continuation of the traditional "perversion of philosophy," and a form of sadistic pleasure in which "reason in
its self-contempt and self-mockery decrees that the realm of truth does
indeed exist, but that reason is debarred from it. 11101 Nietzsche de'

cides that Kant's entire notion of the noumenal realm is fatally flawed
and hopelessly confused.
Nietzsche sees Kant's two mistakes to be his concepts of causality
and noumena.

Nietzsche claims that "there is no such thing as a sense

of causality, as Kant thinks.

The supposed instinct for causality is

only fear of the unfamiliar, and the attempt to discover something familiar in it--is a search, not for causes, but for the familiar. 11102 We
have merely combined our feelings of freedom, will, responsibility, and
intention to perform certain acts into a single concept of "cause", and
then proceeded to "explain" events whenever any condition was detected
in which that event was already contained.

"In fact, we invent all

causes after the schema of the effects--the latter is known to us. 11103
What gives us our firm belief in causality, however, is not just our
habit of seeing one event following another (as Hume suggested), "but
our inability to interpret events other than as events caused by our own
. t en t'10ns. .. 104
in

It is, therefore, this inability that induces us to pos-

it will and intention as the only

effec~ive

forces, and then allows us

to interpret every event as a "deed," each of which presupposes a causal
1ink with its "doer."
As to Kant's noumenal confusions, Nietzsche criticizes these along
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the same lines that Schopenhauer had previously examined.

Since Kant

held that the principle of causality did not apply between the realms of
noumena and phenomena, he could not infer the existence of noumena by
such a principle.

Because noumena are not the direct objects of percep-

tion or intuition (in opposition to Schopenhauer's notion of will),
they are "empty" concepts, i.e., they are concepts without precepts.

In

addition, Nietzsche argues that nothing can exist independently of other
things, and something that does exist in such a manner (a "thing-in-itself") is a thing without properties or, in other words, "no-thing. 11105
Thus, Kant's whole notion of a 11 thing-in-itself 11 is just as perverse to
Nietzsche as a "sense-in-itself" or a "meaning-·in-itself. 11
argues:

Nietzsche

"There are no 'facts..:in-themsel ves 1 , for a sense must always be

projected into them before they can be facts. 11106
So far, Nietzsche's critiques of Kant's mistaken ideas of causality
and noumena have been supported by his theory that language itself distorts and falsifies what it attempts to explain.
tional element in his rejection of Kant's dualism.

But there is an addiNietzsche perceives

that the notion of an inaccessible real or true world acts to degrade
and impoverish this world.

Since Nietzsche views the world as a total-

ity, he investigates the roots of this dualistic theory, and detennines
that concepts such as:

"This apparent, phenomenal world is not the 'real

world 111 are actually based on "Contempt, and hatred for all that perish.
es, changes, varies
. . . 11107 He further explores the "psychology of

metaphysics" to find where such a "valuation of that which remains constant" originates.

Nietzsche concludes:

This world is apparent, consequently, there is a true world;
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--this world is conditioned, consequently there is an unconditioned world . . . this world is one of becoming, therefore,
there is a world of being--all false conclusions (because of
the blind trust in reason: if A exists, then the opposite
concept B must also exist)(somewhere). It is suffering that
inspires these conclusions: fundamentally, they are desires
that such a world should exist: similarly, to imagine another
more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world
that makes one suffer: the 5§ssentiment of metaphysics against
actuality is here creative. 1

•

Against this Kantian "resentment" of reality, Nietzsche turns to
Schopenhauer, who at least accepts the necessity of suffering.

Nietz~

sche, an admitted "disciple" of Schopenhauer for a time, admits in Ecce
.

Homo (1888) that, "It was atheism that had drawn me to Schopenhauer."

109

But this is only one of a number of factors involved in Nietzsche's early
Some of these are the more subtle

enthusiam for Schopenhauer's thought.

elements of influence which Nietzsche discusses in his essay "Schopenhauer as Educator" (1874).

Here Nietzsche cites "his [Schopenhauer's]

honesty, his joy, and his consistency ,lI:O and also praises Schopenhau11

er's persistence in upholding the truth of his "unacceptable" philosophy.
11

He was absolutely alone, with no'-single friend of his own kind to com1

fort him; and between one and none there lies an infinity--as ever between something and nothing. 11111 The analogies with Nietzsche's own
"acceptance" (or lack thereof) in philosophical circles, and of his solitary lifestyle are striking, and Nietzsche undoubtedly felt some affinity with this man he described as his "deliverer. 11112 Even Nietz-;
sche's outrage over the attempts of his contemporaries to "adapt" Schopenhauer's thought to their "enervated"' age is, in light of Nietzsche's
own subsequent use/abuse, prescient as well as poignant.
which might have described Nietzsche's later

fate~

In a passage

he reveals that the
11

new danger has gradually arisen of regarding him (Schopenhaued as an
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odd kind of pungent herb, of taking him in grains, as a sort of metaphysical pepper. 11113
But the significance of Schopenhauer's impact on Nietzsche's own
thought lies in the vision of a universe without purpose or ultimate
meaning, dominated by human suffering and frustration, and itself merely
the expression of a blind will.

Such a world, which can only be glimpsed

through the subjective perception that we are this will, is not a rational structure created by some divine or law-abiding intellect.

Further-

more, this view proves that the human intellect, (the servant of the
11

11

wi 11) can not be an autonomous entity. 11114 With this i nsi qht, Schopen11

hauer not only questioned Kant's emphasis on reason and will as autonomous faculties, but negated Hegel's claim that the real was rational,
and the rational was real.

Nietzsche was forever indebted to Schopen-

hauer for this illumination of the irrational will as the only reality,
with all of its atheistic implications, and for the subordination of the
intellect to the will.
Ironically, it is in reference to Schopenhauer's own most highly
valued belief that Nietzsche failed to acquiesce.

Schopenhauer took

great pride in having attained the 11 one true insight 11 that had eluded
Kant--the knowledge that the noumenal reality was the will.

Although a

detailed exposition of Nietzsche's version of will is to be found in a
later section, suffice it to say that Schopenhauer's metaphysical "will
to live

11

is similar in word
only to Nietzsche's
physiological complex of
-,

drives which, because it enters consciousness as one sensation, is designated by the single word will . 11115 Against Schopenhauer's claim that
11

only the will is really known to us, Nietzsche asserts the complexity of
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the very notion of wi 11:

"Wi 11 i ng seems to me to be above a11 something
.. 116
complicated, something that is a unit only as a word
As Nietzsche explains:

"Sc.hopenhauer's basic misunderstanding of

the will {as if craving, instinct, drive were the essence of will) is
typical . . . for will is precisely that which treats cravings as their
master and appoints to them their way and measure. 11117 The source of
this misunderstanding is Schopenhauer's belief in the noumenal/phenomenal
dualism; therefore, he falls into the same basic error as Kant.

Because

of this, however, Schopenhauer has corrmitted yet another error when he
suggests that "the only way to the 'true', to knowledge; lies in gettin!l
free from affects, from will

11118 This leads Schopenhauer to preach

the renunciation of will and the denial of life itself--unpardonable sins
in Nietzsche's.eyes.· The consequences of Schopenhauer's chaotic, irrational, meaningless reality are anathema to Nietzsche. 119 For Schopenhauer aims at an ascetic suppression of all desires through the compassionate contemplation of the suffering of all life fonns.

When Nietzsche

finally realizes that Schopenhauer's "joy" is one of resignation, rather
than his own one of creative affirmation, he breaks with the bulk of
Schopenhauer's thought.

Hereafter, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer's

teachings in such uncomplimentary tenns as "lunatic interpretations";
or in incensed passages where Nietzsche rails against the absurdity of:
"The 'denial of life' as an aim of life, an aim of evolution!

Existence

as a great stupidity! 11120
Nietzsche thus accepts Kant's notion that we detennine the world,
and Schopenhauer's contention that the will is central to that detennination.

But the world in which the will acts is strictly phenomenal, and
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our interpretation of it is just another instance of will to power--of
the release of life's essential fundamental energies. To Nietzsche, there
is nothing more fundamental in man or nature than this will to power,
which transforms its environment in order to survive. 121 It is only drive
that is basic to all living beings, and Nietzsche takes care to differentiate it from Schopenhauer's 11 will to survive."

Nietzsche detects the

cardinal instinct of all beings to lie in their discharge of strength-their will to power--not in their own self-preservation; consequently,
"self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most freo.uent results. ~1122

In Nietzsche's version, something does not struggle to sur-

vive, as Schopenhauer and Darwin
For the will to power is not

~ight

merely~

say, but survives to struggle.
drive among others (like self-pres-

ervation, sex, or hunger), but a generic trait of all creatures, of
which the other drives are but modes.
Nietzsche tries to reconcile his notion of will to power as a principle of life with his notion that will is something that is a unit only
as a word.

Nietzsche claims that will to power is

from

distinguishe~

desiring, demanding, and striving by the "affect of command. 11123 He
further discusses this problem in his notes written in 1887-1888:

"Is

the 1 will to power' a· kind of 'will' or identical with the concept of
'will 1 ?

Is it the same thing as desiring?

or commanding?

11124

Nietzsche then responds to these questions, and to the suggestion that
will to power is still Schopenhauer's noumenal will, in the following
ways:

the "will" so described does not exist at all; such a "psycholog-

ical description" of will is an "unjustified generalization"; and the
character of the will is eliminated by subtracting its goal--its 11 whith-
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er --from its content.
11

Nietzsche argues that this is precisely what

Schopenhauer did in his system, v1ith the fina1 result that will
11

nothing more than an empty word. 125

11

became

,.

Yet this answer is surely insufficient to the task of explaining
the confusion between will to power as a kind of metaphysical principle,
or as a phenomenological observation.
the first sense when he exclaims:
nothing beside!

Nietzsche appears to use will in

"This world is will to power--and

And you yourself are also this will to power--and noth-

ing beside! 11126 And he employs it in the second sense when he suggests
that will

11

is only a simplifying conception of the understanding, as is

'matter' . 11127

It is with this latter understanding in mind that Nietzsche

frequently reminds us:

"There is no such thi nq as

1

v1i ll', but only a

one must not remove the aim from the total condition--

willed something:

as epistemologists do . .

11

1_28

It appears a-s though Nietzsche's use of "will" depends upon his topical -concern of the moment.

When he reveals that, ·"The inner world is

the will is one of these•! 129 , he is arguing against

ful 1 of spooks .

the existence of all 11 faculties 11 , including the will in its Kantian garb.
He offers, instead, an empirical explanation of our behavior.

Nietzsche

finds that since we usually behave in reasonably predictable ways, we
get habits of expectation.

Repeated successful predictions give us a

sense of power, and we then explain our behavior by believino that it is
our will which is causing our actions.

But, in liaht of his other views

on the mistaken concept of causality, Nietzsche concludes that this is
i 11 usory.

For our human 11 rea 1i ty 11 is nothing more than a 11 bundl e of oas-

sions and drives,

11

many of which we are either unconscious of, or wrong
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about, and nothing else is

11

real 11 except our drives. 130 ~Jhat Nietzsche

means by such statements is that the wi 11 does not

11

exi st 11 in any no um-

enal sense, just as Soul, Reason, Spirit, Truth, or Thinking do not exist
separately from the human animal who uses such concepts to help in his
interpretation of the world. 131 These are all "fictions", but they derive their psychological utility from their ability to protect our 11 egos 11
from vanishing in the multiplicity of change. 132

In this sense, it seems

reasonable for Nietzsche to include 11 will 11 in his list of "tremendous
b1unders, 11 for he sees that it is

11 which is a h1ays invoked whenever
there are 11 effects 11 to be explained. 133
v~i

But no matter how useful will may be as a psychological hypothesis
to explain human behavior, it has other functions of equal imoortance to
Nietzsche's overall philosophical project.

When he uses will to power

in a metaphysical sense (as the basis for us and our world), the will
becomes a unifying monistic principle available for use in his constant
batt 1e

.
.
denying
.
. . in
. t erpre t at.ions. 135
against
t he 1ifeprospects of d ua 1 istic

When he employs it in Zarasthustra as the 11 will to overcome oneself, 11
will to power serves as the means by which we can transform ourselves,
and our world, for the better.

And when Nietzsche says:

"To impose up-

on becoming the character of being--that is the supreme will to power, 11136
he is using it in yet another sense--that of interpretation.
veals:

As he re-

"It is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what ex-

tent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure
to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of
it oneself. 11137

And this, I think, is the best vJa.Y of making sense of

Nietzsche's contradictory statements. 138
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If, contrary to John Locke's belief, it is not our minds which are
tabula rasa, but our very world, then Nietzsche's attempt to interpret
this world--to impose a structure and meaning on the otherwise
senselessness of reality"--becomes an admirable one.

11

blank

To will means to

will "something" (as opposed to Schopenhauer's view); our world, therefore, awaits our creation for its very value and significance.

But this

demands an extraordinary effort on our part, as Nietzsche admits:

"I

assess man by the quantum of power and the abundance of his will

I

assess the power of a will by hmv much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage . . . 11139 This latter suggestion, that we must know how to turn our suffering to our "advantage'',
is crucial.

Suffering per se is not admirable to Nietzsche (more on

this later) as it was to Schopenhauer, but overcominq our necessary suffering is.

And one way to do this is to impose our will--our interpre-

tation--on our world.

What Nietzsche ultimately offers us is an inter-

pretation of our attempts to interpret the world.

Of course, if every-

thing is an interpretation (not 11 the 11 interpretation), then Nietzsche's
own "thought experiment", suggesting the will to power as the basis of
all interpretation, is likewise 11 only an interpretation. 11
however, an objection.

For Nietzsche remarks:

so is on 1y i nterpreta ti on .

This is not,

11 Supposi nq that this a 1-

. well, so much the better. 11140

Nietzsche, nevertheless, is not content with offering only interpretations and perspectives on our human plight.
the 11 original

11

He still seeks to uncover

motives behind such doctrines as the will.

Nietzsche

discovers that our habit of tracing everything back to a "will, an intention, a responsible act 11 actually was invented for the sake of oun-
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ishment.
It was the social utility of punishment that guaranteed this
concept its dignity, its power, its truth. The originators of
this psychology--the psychology of will--are to be sought in
the classes that administer penal law, and the priests--they
wanted to create for themselves a riaht to take revenqe--wanted to create a right for God to take~revenge. To this end,
man was seen as 1 free 1 ; to this end, every action had to be
co~ceiv!~ of as willed, the origin of every action as conscious. 1
While such a bald assertion initially appears to be patently false,
Nietzsche unearths the heretofore hidden connection between our alleged
"free \.'Jill" and punishment.

He finds that the entire theory of responsi-

bility (which assumes free will for our acts) depends upon the false presupposition that one is responsible only for what one has willed.
Nietzsche develops this theory more fully he observes:

When

"there must be a

principle in man, a 'free will', as first cause; for if man is not a
first cause as will, then he is irresponsible--therefore, he has no
business before the moral tribunal . . . In summa:

so that man may re-

.
.
l f , he mus t be capa bl e of d01ng
spec t himse
ev1· 1 . 11142

Nietzsche thus tackles this persistent problem of the freedom of
the will which has troubled thinkers since the time of Paul, but he does
so with a typical twist.

Instead of the tradi ti ona l focus on our ability

to choose between good and evil, (which assumes that the greater benefit
accrues to those \'1ho choose the "good"), Nietzsche focusses on the effects of our ability to do "evil".

And these effects have to do more

with the sociological consequences of such actions, than with the ethical issues supposedly involved.

By locatin9 the origin of this theory

cf free will in the motivation for revenge of those who wielded social/
political power, Nietzsche sets the stage for his contention that the
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will to power erases all distinctions between good and evil.

The whole

system of punishments and rewards is no more than the attempt, by those
in power, to maintain and solidify their control over others, and is
simply the manifestation of their own will to power.

Those unlucky e-

nough to be punished are merely used as the means by which others are
warned against performing similar acts.

They are not punished because

they 11 deserve 11 it, but because it serves the interests of those in power. 143
Unlike his philosophical predecessors, whose primary concern with
the freedom of the will purportedly was derived from their interest in
the normative consequences attending such theories, Nietzsche's concern
is with the psychological sources of these concepts:

this gives him a

different angle from which to attack the prevailing notions.

From this

perspective, he discovers that this doctrine of free will, (which he
describes as a "hundred-times refuted theoryn, 144 or as an "erroneous
article of faith'' inherited from our primordial ancestors), 145 actually
serves several different psychological needs.

Again, depending upon his

particular topic of consideration, Nietzsche ascertains that our feelin9
of free will originated in our sense of pride, power, and strength; 146
or, alternatively, in our need to justify cruelty and give meaning to
the suffering of ourselves and others. 147
Although Nietzsche understands the motives behind such impulses, he
believes that they rest on a basic misunderstanding of our real psychological processes and requirements--which he explains in terms of our
will to power.

He perceives that, at one time, there were benefits to

be gained for all of us from the priestly and ascetic interpretations of
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our suffering, for:

1
'

The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering it-

self, was the curse which hitherto lay spread out over mankind . . . 11148
And Nietzsche believes that any meaning was (and still is) preferable to
no meaning at all.

Yet Nietzsche argues that there are many 11 meanings 11

to be offered, and that the one suggested by the fallacious notion of
free will is the "foulest of all theologians' artifices, aimed at making
mankind responsible in their sense, that is, dependent upon them.

11

149

It is a lie 11 which even the priests know to be a lie, but one which
11

they have found useful in perserving their power over others.

150

But

Nietzsche's real antipathy to this doctrine lies in its fundamental connection with Christian morality, which he seeks to re-evaluate because
of its insidious, life-negating consequences.

In fact, Nietzsche sees

the entire history of moral valuations as the "history of an error, the
error of responsibility, which is based upon the error of the freedom of
the will 11. 151
To understand how an error of such magnitude arose, (the results 0f
which are, to Nietzsche, still adversely affectin9 our comorehension of
our world and ourselves, and thus are supremely important to his

01;1m

project) it is necessary to digress and look first at Nietzsche's examination of the morals of the ancient and the Christian worlds.

The great

disparity between these valuations convinces Nietzsche that there is no
single morality, but only different moralities.

This conclusion results

in his denial of the existence of any "essential good 11 , and i 11 ustrates
~ietzsche's

contention that moral values are phenomena, i.e., made for

and by us in our everyday world--which is the only one there is.

But

there is an element in common 1t1hich both the ancient and Christian moral-
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ities share:

the concept of "obedience to a command".

''To be moral,

virtuous, ethical means to obey a long-established law or tradition.
Whether one obeys gladly or reluctantly is immaterial:
that one obeys . .

it is enough

Nietzsche thus reveals that it is the act of

obeying a command, rather than the nature of that command--its content-\~hich

has been of primary importance in moral matters. He also claims
that, "To become moral is not in itself moral 153 since we may do so
11

,

for a variety of reasons--from despair, or self-interest, or vanity, or
"slavish obedience".

And these insights seem to place Nietzsche closer

to Kant than we might initially expect.

For both are insisting on the

primacy of the fonn of the command (Kant 1 s categorical imperative) in
moral valuations; and on the importance of obeying such a command for
its own sake.
Yet these similarities do not obscure the profound differences between their views.
times explicit)

11

Kant's pronouncements carry an implicit (and some-

ought 11 in their content.

That is, the cate9orical im-

perative ought to be followed for its own sake, regardless of any specific content.

Nietzsche 1 s remarks, however, do not carry a similar burden,

since he is making observations instead of exhortations.

He is not in-

terested, at least at this point, in suggesting what we "should" be doing, but rather in revealing the psychological origins of what we are
doing.

Of even greater significance is ,Nietzsche 1 s claim that morality

is merely another one of the various constructs which we impose upon
certain phenomena.

And here he irrevocably parts company from Kant.

To

Nietzsche, moral values are simply matters of opinion, i.e., interpretati ons.

As such, they lack the noumena 1 reality and respectabi 1i ty \'!i th
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which Kant clothes them, for they are nothinq more than the ''sign-language of the feelings 11 • 154
But if "morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs 11 , 155 why is Nietzsche so opposed to the Christian and,
because of his similar intent, the Kantian
tional

11

11

interpretations 11 and tradi-

customs 11 ? It seems, at first, unfair for Nietzsche to single

these out as the objects of his venomous re-evaluation of values, especially in light of his own insistence on the importance of interpretations
and perspectives.

Nietzsche explains his position in the following ways.

On the one hand, he reminds us that, "Actions are never what they appear
to us to be!

We have expended so much labor on learning that external
things are not as they appear to us to be 11 ; 156 yet we have refused to

apply similar reasonin9 to our "inner world", and perceive that it is
the motivations behind our moral actions which are ''essentially unknown11.157 We thus act as if we had gained a profound insight into the
11

real 11 world, and succumb to the delusion that there is only one, abso-

lute, 11 true 11 moral world order.

Yet this is as mistaken a notion as was

primitive man's attempt to assign gender to all things:

"In the same

way man has ascribed to all that exists a connection with morality and
laid an ethical significance on the world's back.

One day this will

have as much value, and no more, as the belief in the masculinity or
femininity of the sun has today. 11158
Hhat both the Christian and Kantian systems fail to perceive is
that we are biological beings, po\'1ered by drives which are themselves
transformed by moral judgments.

The very same drive can be viewed as

either cmrnrdly or humble, because a drive has "neither this moral char-
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acter at all, nor even a definite attendant sensation of pleasure or
displeasure:

it acquires all this . . . only when it enters into relations with drives already baptized good or evil ...•.i 59 For example,

Nietzsche reveals that the early Greeks sa1-1 "envy" as good, and "hope"
as "deceitful and blind," \'Jhile the Christians regarded them exactly op.
. ken nature of most notions
.
pos1. t e. 160 N.ie t zsc he emp has1zes
t he m1sta
of
morality when he discloses that even the drive to distinction is not
~1hat

it appears to be.

which our

O\'Jn

It is actually a form of "refined cruelty", in

wi 11 to power seeks to awaken feelings of envy and impo-

tence in others in the face of our greater virtue and perfection.
even our "holiest" saints are not exempt from these motives:
ti ty of the nun:

And

''The chas-

with v.ihat punitive eyes it l oaks into the faces of

women who live otherwise!

how much joy in revenqe there is in these

eyes!"161
Not only is Christian morality mistaken in what it venerates, but
it is inconsistent and irrational, since it condemns that which it presupposes--our "life forces."

But, what is even more repulsive to Nietz-

sche, Christianity is "hostile to life" itself because it sees normal
human behavior as "sinful."

Furthermore, it is sclf-ri9hteously ignor-

ant of its own motivations.

While Christianity claims that

egoi~m

and

will to power are evil, it actually represents the egoism and will to
power of the slavish and weak.

Although Christianity admits that cruelty

is evil, its own virtues are achieved by self-cruelty and torture.

And

when it denounces our human passions and instincts, Christianity fails
to perceive that its own denunciation is a product of these very same
forces. 162 Christianity thus takes as "absolute truth" what is psycho-
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logically and empirically false.

Even worse, this adoption of 11 absolute 11

standards results in the relegation of all different standards to the
realm of 11 lies, 11 where any other claims to 11 truth 11 are negated.

Yet

Christianity 1 s very refusal to recognize that 11 all of life is based on
semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspective and error 11163 encourages Nietzsche to develop his
transvaluation of values.

O\'m

project--the

This is of the ultimate importance, because

11 we need to choose between doing a\A1ay with our venerations--or with ourselves!11164
As the first step in this transvaluation of values, Nietzsche argues that it is our will to power, the aggressive dynamic of life itself,
which is the real foundation of morals, as it is of all else.

In opoo-

sition to Kant 1 s examination of our a priori moral foundations, Nietzsche
claims that moral values are formed a posteriori, since they develop out
of the contingencies of individual responses to constantly changinq situations.

What is naturally ''good" is \.'1hatever enables man to realize

his needs.

For, 11 All truly noble morality 9rov1s out of triumphant self-

affi rma ti on

11165

As evidence for this surprising contention, Nietz-

sche cites the evidence gained from his own exploration into the oriain
of such words as

11

good 11 and 11 bad 11 •

He suggests, on the basis of his

discoveries, that the vmrds for 11 good 11 all initially meant

11

noble 11 or

11 aristocratic 11 in the "social sense", i.e., as a social group; and that
the words for 11 bad 11 originally meant ~lebian , or one of a low social
order. 166 He uses the German term 11 schlecht 11 (bad) as an example, and
11

11

etymolo9ically identical 11 \Alith the word 11 schlicht 11
167
(plain, simple).
But unfortunately, this original morality, which

finds that it is

11
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vias based upon the natural strength and will to power of the "nobles" (o
term that supports his identification of "good" vlith "aristocratic"),
has been overthrown.
There has been a "slave revolt'' in morals, whereby the rancor and
resentment of weaker men have become creative and given birth to the values which are dominant in Western civilizations today.

The will to pow-

er of the impotent has disguised itself by hiding behind such notions as
11

spirituality or "compassion", and then used these concepts as a means
11

of triumphing over the strong.

Nietzsche proclaims that the powerless

have embraced these ideals solely because they offer the weak an indirect way of attaining power over others.

Nietzsche further reveals that

such ideals as compassion or pity are really the most agreeable feelings
of power known to those who are without any prospects of greater conquests.

Yet this will to power of the weak is essentially of a different

kind of wi 11 from that of the strong, for it is an impotent form of rower that actually disparages the concept of power per se, and offers
nothing positive to replace the toppled paragon of strength.

But, what

is even a greater sign of debasement and degeneracy, the weak arouse the
feelings of pity in others with the fundamental objective of hurting
them, of causing others to share in their own sufferino through the very
act of comprehending such misery.
power over the strong. 168

The weak thereby exhibit their own

Nietzsche thus unmasks not only the psychological perversity behind
such Christian "virtues" as compassion and suffering, but also 'illuminates the intrinsic absurdity of Schopenhauer's morality, which was
based precisely on these notions.

"To expect that strength will not
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manifest

itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate,

to have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to
expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength. 11169

Nietzsche

blames both the curious inability of the strong to see throuqh the devious machinations of the weak, and the dualistic interpretation of the
world reinforced by Kant, for the fact that this disastrous subversion
of values reigns supreme in contemporary Christian societies.

Nietzsche

explains that once the existence of noumenal reality has been postulated
and accepted, the concept of "strength" becomes absolutized into a neutral entity-in-itself which has the option either to manifest or to contain itself.

As a result of this metaphysical "sleight of hand", it ap-

pears as though it is within the discretion of the strong to act as
though they were weak--for the "birds of prey" to become the "lambs".
Nietzsche contends that it is in this manner that the strong are called
to account for experiencing their natural aggression upon the weak.

For

it is with this appearance of "free choice" in such matters that the
weak are able to triumph over the stronq--the slaves over the masters. 170
Furthermore, these slaves, with the ''wily vengefulness of the impotent", successfully transform their inherent weakness into a meritori ous deed--into "kindness".

And this is what constitutes their "greatest

trick", whereby those who are unable to avenge themselves are said to be
- unwilling to do so; therefore, they become not only the "good" but the
11

j us t" a s we 11 .
Nietzsche, however, asserts that it is only the powerful who are

capable of either justice or injustice, and that the rhetoric of toleration, \'lith which the weak try to obscure the reality of their ethical
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transvaluation, is intended to veil their own vindictive will to rule-their natural will to power.

Moreover, it is senseless to speak of jus-

tice or injustice, right or wrong per se.

For there are no absolute,

universal standards of good or evil, there are only varyin0 interpretations and valuations, in which the very same acts (lying, cheating, killing, exploiting), depending upon the specific situation, may be socially
condoned or condemned. 171
But this perversion of values is, to Nietzsche, more than merely a
case of the weak masquerading as the strong, or the ambiguous nature of
the concepts of good and evil as they apply to changing conditions.

It

is, rather, an essentially dangerous inversion of the moral realm, in
which the strong and noble were conquered by deceit and resentment, and
were fatally transformed into those who saw themselves as the weak had
labelled them--as the cruel, the evil, and the damned.

For the impotent

have, "with frightening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic
value equations good/noble/powerful/beautiful/happy/favored-of-the-gods
and maintain, with the furious hatred of the underprivileged and impotent, that 'only the poor, the powerless are good; only the suffering,
sick, and ugly, truly blessed' . 11172
Christianity, as the heir to this tradition of control based upon
hatred and indirect manipulation, has actually succeeded in imposing
artificial limits on man's will; and prevented him from becoming what he
actually is--the creator, who actively and directly shapes both his
world and his values.

Nietzsche thus reveals that the traditionally

"good" man really represents "not merely a retrogression but even a

dan~-

er, a temptation. a narcotic drug enabling the present to live at the

50

expense of the future. 11173 Although this may appear to be a more comfortable and less dangerous course than its alternative, it is, in the
long run, the greatest danger to man as a species insofar as it prevents
him from reaching his highest potential.
Nietzsche believes that only through self-awareness can we even
hope to see that our natural inclinations to exert our own will to power
are not bad 11 --that they are, in fact, removed from such mundane consid11

erations as

11

good and "evil
11

11

But first, Nietzsche sees that it is

•

necessary to free us from these false values:
our own lives and future.
ters of traditional

11

to give us final say over

And this essential emancipation from the fet-

degenerate morality can only be accomplished by
11

going "beyond good and evil".

For, "To reco9nize untruth as a condition

of life--that certainly means resistin9 the accustomed valued feelings
in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token
alone place itself beyond good and evil . 11174
This is one of Nietzsche's greatest projects:

to create new values,

new standards, and new ''truths" based on what we consciously know to be
human (not divine or real
11

interpretations, rerspectives, and errors--

11
)

for these are the only truths we will ever have.
11

have

to build upon

our world.

11

11

To do this, we will

lies and errors, which are inescapable oarts of
11

But this is really what we have been doin9 all along, al-

though unknowingly, because when we are faced with new facts or events,
"We construct a new picture . . . with the aid of all the old experiences
11175 What Nietzsche wants is for us to begin
which we have had .
doing this consciously, and to realize that just because something is
traditionally valued does not mean that it is, therefore, "true", but
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only that it is an old 11 lie 11 , which has forgotten its origins and seeks
to intimidate us into accepting it at face value.

Yet we can no longer

safely take refuge in these old outworn values, for they are unhealthy
11

11

and antagonistic to our future development; and they deny the validity
of the wi 11 to power as the basis of mora 1ity.

Neither can

fort in the 11 truths 11 of our senses, since they also lie:
finds our senses

. hostile and reluctant .

\'Je

seek com-

11 What

is new

All this means:

sically and from time immemorial we are--accustomed to lying

haone

is much more of an artist than one knows. 11176
These pronouncements have an emotionally and intellectually jarring
impact on us, as does Nietzsche's contention that he is "immoral" in the
sense that it means "denying that moral judgments are founded on
truths . .

Therefore, I deny morality in the same way as I deny alche-

my, 1. .e., I deny 1. t s hypo th eses . . . 11177

And this is Nietzsche's in-

tenti on, for he hopes to thereby awaken us from our phi 1osophi ca lly and
theologically induced stupor, and alert us to the perils of this complacent course.

As he warned us, it is dangerous to tunnel into the found-

ations of morality.

But some of our knee-jerk aversion to these procla-

mations might be avoided if we remember Nietzsche's admonition that all
language, concepts, constructs, as well as sensory data, 11 lie 11 in that
they simplify and thus distort what they seek to communicate.

Further-

more, Nietzsche cites an error in reasoning as the basis for the notion
of 11 antitheses 11 , by which things are categorized as:
good/evil, or real/apparent.

moral/immoral,

Nietzsche argues that there are "no oppo-

sites" except in the exaggerations of m~taphysical interpretations. 178
And this is yet another reason for his dislike of the dualisms propound-
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ed by Kant, Schopenhauer, and the Christian perspectives.

Since Nietz-

sche 1 s own assertion, that we desire always to auqment our power, is itself neutral with respect to approval or disapproval, he provides us
with an interpretation that ignores such easy antitheses.
But more to the point, Nietzsche sees that,

11

The frightful

ener~

gies--those which are called evil--are the cyclopean architects and
road-makers of humanity. 11179 He argues that our 11 good 11 qualities (in
the conventional sense of being

11

humane 11 ) actually have evolved from our

earlier evil 11 (in the sense of brutish and cruel) qualities because
11

th ey can no th ave come f ram anyv1 here else. lBO Alth oug h N.le t zsc he, t oo,
desires what is good and civilized, he perceives that these goals cannot
be achieved without the precedinq work of what we would call evil.
other words,
11

favoring

11

virtue 11 • 181
science 11 •

11

envy 11 ,

11

violence 11 , 'greed 11 , and

11

1

hatred 11 all belong to the

circumstances which result in 11 great 11 men and
They have, therefore, their own

11

In

11

increases in

value 11 , as does "bad con-

And Nietzsche approves of 11 bad conscience 11 because he per-

ceives it to be nothing more than a 11 temporary illness 11 , similar to
pregnancy, which is actually 11 full of future".
Furthermore, it was this "bad conscience 11 that made of man something
other than a beast --something that could be

11

overcome~

proclaims in Thus Spoke Zarasthustra (1883):

11

Man is something that

11

11

11

As Nietzsche

shall be overcome. 11182 But this was not originally possible, for it was
only when man suffered from such evils--from himself as the architect of
these evils--that he became a promise 11 to be somethinq more, and al11

tered the earth itself in order to fulfill his own needs.

And this is

yet another reason why we must go beyond the simple antitheses of good
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and evil, real and apparent, or true and false, and develop our own
scale of values--but consciously this time, and with concern for the
very human consequences involved.
that our

Moreover, v-ie must take care to see

ones, instead of be183
ing rooted out, as all previous moralities have sought to do.
11

bad passions are cultivated into _good
11

11

11

Or, to use Nietzsche's term, these evil drives must be sublimated".
11

This means that they must be transformed into somethinq else. Since we
possess the same basic drives as do the beasts, the only way that these
can be converted into something distinctively human is by such sublimation of our own will to power. 184 And the personification of such a
subli1:1ation is Nietzsche's

11

superman 11 •

Essentially, this concept of the

superman represents Nietzsche's greatest project of all, because it
sf10vJs the means by wllich we, as individuals, can actively transform O?lrselves, and therefore our world, into something that is better.

That is,

into something that is both beyond our present simplistic interpretation
of our passions and drives as "good/evil"; and beyond humanity itself as
it nov1 exists.

In fact, Nietzsche reminds us that
man is that he is a bridge and not a goal. 11185

"~!hat

is qreatest in

Although this notion is in direction opposition to Kant's contention
that man is, and should ah1ays be treated as, an "end" and not as a
11

means

11

,

to Nietzsche, this is precisely man's value.

It is not that

the fundamental nature of will to power has been chan?ed, but that its
objects have been.

For Nietzsche's superman is one who has successful-

ly organized the chaos of his own passions and become creative:
not succumbed to despair and nihilism

in

he has

the face of life's terrors, but

instead has become master over his own fears and affirmed life without

54

resentment.

He has thereby channeled his destructive will to power;

which sweeps away all previous moral distinctions!into the positive construction and creation of new values and new interpretations.

The super-

man thus illustrates the acme of will to power, which is embodied in his
own self-control, and faces life without fear of himself, others, or his
own mortality.

And this is Nietzsche's most important achievement, for

it enables him to transcend the

11

modern nihilism 11 which he sees as ulti-

mately destructive of all values, and of all life.
claims:

11

As Nietzsche pro-

Not 'humanity', but superman is the goal ! 11186

One of the consequences of this notion is Nietzsche's adamant assertion that some of our interpretations--our 11 myths 11 --are better than others, (just as a strong will is better than a weak one), for they facilit at e

.
187
our own se l f -overcoming.

This also helps to explain Nietzsche's

impassioned intolerance of those who prove themselves to be so impotent
that they are unable to use their will to create.

But Nietzsche's imna-

tience on this issue is equally indebted to his deep-seated animosity to
the Kantian and Christian claims that this apparent world is not the
11

rea 111 one.

Fundamentally, these two concepts are intertwined, for they

both betray a fatal failure of nerve: "The belief which holds that the
world, which ought to b.e,

~real,

is a belief of the unproductive, of

those \<Jho will not create a world as it ought to be.

They imagine that

it is there, and they seek ways and means to attain it. 11188 And in so
doing, they divert their attention, energy, and will from those problems
which they actually could overcome, and prevent themselves from ever becoming

11 superman. 11

The intrinsic dissimilarity between Nietzsche's views and those of
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Kant and Schopenhauer is hereby revealed.

Neither Kant nor Schopenhauer

permit us to have final control--and thus power over--the creation of
our world or ourselves, and this is Nietzsche's ultimate aim.

Nietzsche,

writing at the end of the 19th century, is able.to look back over the
previous developments in politics, philosophy, and psychology, and see
that these have been insufficient in providing us with the means to attain our individual potential.

What is needed is a new interpretation

which will enable us to wrest control from the steadily increasing power
of the state, which Nietzsche sees as epitomized by Bisriarck 1 s "bombastic nationalism", and that of society, which Nietzsche perceives as emasculating us by encouraging our submission to the
ness.

11

herd ideals" of weak-

Nietzsche fears that if we do not become conscious of our person-

al will to power--of our individual ability to alter our world and thereby make a substantial difference--that we wi 11 succumb to the ni hi l i s.n
which is robbing us of our will to create.

And he believes that this

nihilism is the greatest danger of all, and is, furthermore, a part of
the legacy left by the philosophical investigations of Kant and Schopenhauer.

For Kant's limitation of reason shows that we can never know any

"real" world, although we believe that it exists; and Schopenhauer's illumination of the irrational will, operating in a purposeless universe,
as the basis of this "reality" demonstrates that
tent.

11

are ultimately impo-

It appears that Nietzsche s description of a nihilist can thus be
1

interpreted as a resounding condemnation of both
for~

\'Je

Schopenhauer and Kant,

A nihilist is one who judges of the world as it is that it ought

not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. 11189

Conclusion
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In reviewing the development of the concept of will, from its earliest appearance as appetites or desires, to its modern transformation into the will to power, one curious fact emerges which has not yet been
addressed.

Why have the greatest proponents of the will--from Kant, who

first liberates the will to use it as the foundation of all morality, to
Nietzsche, who celebrates it as the means by which we may alter our present, and thereby our future--al 1 been German philosophers?· It has
been suggested that this focus on the will--on human control over certain
attitudes or events--may have resulted from the chaotic sufferin0 produced by the Thirty Years I vJar (1618-1648) in the Germani es.
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This

was an anarchic experience v1hich the rest of Europe, at least in terms
of the extent and duration of constant hostilities, was able to avoid.
But this breakdovm of political, social and moral or<ler and securit.v
left a lasting imprint on the Germanies.
al controi vJas achieved under the
early 19

th

And whi1e a modicum of intern-

Confede"~ation

of German states in the

century, the actual state of affairs was one which was charac-

terized by inefficiency and inertia.

Thuss it has been hyoothesized

that the German fascination with vJill per se, and specifically v!ith a
"strong will

,n

may have grown out of a deep-seated historical desire for

actually accomplishing something, for followina throur:ih on an intended
ideal.

In this analysis, the "Prussian efficiency" embodied by Bismarck

in his war against Austria (1866), and his eventual unification of the
German states under the Empire (1871), illustrate the practical appeal
of such a focus on will.

But this sug~estion, althouah intriguin9, does

not seem to do justice to the diverse insights and aims of Kant, Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche.
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Kant, who admits that a "free \'Ii 11

could

be a monstrous thing

11191

if it were not autonomous, i.e., subject to its own moral laws, nevertheless maintains that this "still remains c. useful and proper idea for
the purposes of a rational faith. 11192

For it is to the task of devisinq

an adequate and accurate guide to the ethical decision-making precess
that Kant sets iris ovm "pure practical reason"--his ovm viill.

Even

Nietzsche would agree that Kant is successful in this endeavor, at least
to the extent that Kant systematically illuminates the boundaries beyond
which reason fails to be an "adequate guide" to one's moral actions.
But it is within the osychological realm, with its irrational, insinctual components, that Kant's attempt ultimately founders.
Schopenhaeur perceives that there is a fundamental flaw in Kant's
theory, and therefore

examin~s

what Kant had avoided--the emotional, ir-

ra tiona 1 nature of r.ian and his uni verse.
ovm version of the

_Schopenhauer thus

rm sits

his

11 noumenal \-Jill", v1hich is instinctual, irrationa1, and

purposeless, as the basis for his new system.

Yet Schopenhauer's view

has its own "flaws", central to v1hich is his admission that the only escape from the meaningless misery of his vision lies through the intellectual suppression of the all-pov1erful v1il 1.

But Schopenhauer never ex-

plains hov1 our intellect, which he often describes as a sighted lame man
who is carried by a blind man (the will),
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can ever attain

supre~acy,

no matter how fleeting, over the incessant striving of the will.

For

how can an intellect affirm or deny the will, when the will itself seems
to 1 i e in the noumenal realm, outside of the phenomena 1 \'lorl d of this
intellect?

By what mechanism can this ·intellect, raised as the "servant"

of the will, attain its independence and actually become "will-less"?
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It would appear to require some sort of transcendental quality to accomp. feat, but Schopenhauer has not granted it
. any. 194
. h th e hero1c
1 is
Even Kant's theories, "bloodlessly rational" though they rnay be,
are more helpful to Nietzsche's project of
hauer's.

hu~an

liberation than Schopen-

For Kant calls not only for freedom from external constraints,

but for the fulfillment of ourselves through the freedom of our own
self-determination.

This is the meaninq of Kant's insistence upon the

autonomy of our mora 1 vJi 11 , whereby the mora 1 1if e (one that is 1i ved
under the self-imposed law of the categorical imperative) is eauivalent
to freedom--and this is a radical sense of "self-determination".

Yet

Nietzsche, who would approve of the concept of self-determination, would
go further and inquire, as Zarasthustra did, "Free for what?"

And Nietz-

sche would then inquire: "Can you 9ive yourself your own evil and your
own good and hang your

ow~

will over yourself as a law?

your own judge and avenger of your law?" 195
the ranks of the potential

Can you be

If so, you could enter iilto

supermen--the creators of a more

hu~ane

~·mrld.

But Kant could not, for it would be blasphemy for one who had tried
to "make room for

faith~',

to do so.

And Schopenhauer vmuld not, for he

believes that, for men to live is merely to be what they already are,
and there is no chance of heroic self-transcendence possible in this
view.

Yet Nietzsche, also, would have trouble followina the path sug-

gested by Zarasthustra.
and asks instead:

For he sees too clearly the dangers involved,
"today--is greatness possible?" 1Q6
If it is possib 1e,

Nietzsche believes that:

"He shall be greatest who can be loneliest,

the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and
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evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will . 11197 But
Nietzsche already fears that some of his own thoughts are on the
of becoming accepted:

ver~e

11 You have already taken off your novelty, and some

of you are ready, I fear, to become truths:

they already look so im-

mortal, so pathetically decent, so dull! 11198 And once they become
11 truths 11 , they will become as fixed, and canonical, and stale, and bind-

ing as those which preceded them.

Yet even this perception does not

daunt Nietzsche for long, or convince him of the impossibility of transforming ourselves and our world, for he believes that even this

111

Truth

is the vlill to be master over the multiplicity of sensations . . . 11199

1

fiO
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individualized instruction in all academic subjects for students
at the junior high level with learning/behavior disorders. Compiled case studies; administered academic and modality assessments~
and implemented all requisite remediation in specific deficit
areas for these designated students.

Dates:
Title:
Em pl ayer:
Duties:

1973-1977
Research Assistant
Dr. Joseph Dubbert, New Concord, Ohio.
Researched materials for inclusion in Dr. Dubbert's book, A Man's
Place, published by Prentice Hall-Spectrum Series, 1978.

Dates:
Title:
Employer:
Du ti es:

9/1973-6/1974
Assistant to History Department
Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio.
Provided necessary support to assigned faculty members in the
History Department.
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Dates:
Title:
Employer:
Duties:

5/1967-9/1967
Astrophysics Laboratory Assistant
Aero-Space Research Laboratories, Wright Patterson A.F.B., Ohio.
Made tracings from oscillograph recordings on light intensity reflected from early satellites--Echo I and II, etc. This work was
later incorporated into a book published by Aero-Space Research
Laboratories, 1968.

Awards and Honors
1966:

Recipient of National Federation of Women's Clubs Award for Outstanding High School Senior. Dayton, Ohio.

1966:

Received full scholarship to Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio.

1974:

Graduated Magnacum Laude in the Honors Program at Muskingum College,
with Distinction in the Department of Philosophy and Religion, and
in the Department of History.

1982:

Awarded Graduate Assistantship in the Department of History, Uni•
versity of Richmond, Virginia.

1983:

Recipient of Albright JI.ward for Outstanding Graduate Student in
the Humanities. University of Richmond, Virginia.

1983-1984:

Awarded University Fellowship for Ph.D. program in the History
Department, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

1984-1985:

Awarded Teaching Assistantship in History, Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio.

Honorary Affiliations
1965:

National Honor Society

1967:

Phi Sigma Tau, National Philosophy Honorary.

1972:

Phi Alpha Theta, National History Honorary.

Presentations
1968:

Student Invitational Speaker at funeral services held in honor of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio.
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1978:

Creativity and the Exceptional Child, by Jane E. Edwards. Paper
presented to Meeting of the Upper Arlington City Tutors of Learning/Behavior Disabled students.

1984:

Hitler: From 11 Superman 11 to 11 Underdog 11 • A Study of the Intentional i st/Functionalist Controversy in Contemporary Historiography.
Paper presented at the Phi Alpha Theta Annual Conference, held at
the University of Toledo, Ohio.

Publications
Edwards, Jane E. A Genealogy of the Will: A Comparison of the
Works of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. University Microfilms
International, 1986.
Service
1972-1974:

President and vice-president of Phi Sigma Tau, National Philosophy
Honorary, Delta Chapter, Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio.

9/1984-8/1985:

Representative for Graduate Student Affairs Council, (G.S.A.C.)
for the History Department, Ohio State University, Columbus,
Ohio.

1/1985-6/1985:

Member of Graduate Student Recommendation Committee, for History Departmental Chairman Search Committee, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
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